I study a standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) noisy rational expectations economy, but relax the usual assumption of the normality of fundamental and supply. My solution approach dispenses with the typical "conjecture and verify" method and enables me to analytically solve an entire class of previously intractable nonlinear models that nests the standard model. I show how: (1) price jumps and crashes may arise endogenously, purely due to learning effects, (2) observation of the net trading volume of informed and noise traders may be valuable for investors in the economy as it can provide a refinement of the information conveyed by price, (3) the value of acquiring information may be non-monotonic in the number of informed traders, leading to multiple equilibria in the information market, and (4) the relation between disagreement and future returns is ambiguous. In short, many of the results from noisy rational expectations models are not robust. Finally, I introduce monotone likelihood ratio conditions that determine the signs of the various comparative statics, which represents the first demonstration of the importance of the MLRP for comparative statics in this literature. * Special thanks to my advisor Christine Parlour for continuous guidance and detailed comments on many drafts. Thanks also to
Introduction
Since at least Hayek (1945) economists have recognized that an important role of financial markets is the aggregation and transmission of information held by individual traders.
There is a vast literature, both theoretical and empirical, that seeks to understand how well prices reflect information and what frictions best explain apparent deviations from market efficiency.
1 Following this literature, I seek to explore several questions: How do traders react to the information in prices? Are asset prices a sufficient statistic for all public information? Are prices necessarily more informative when more traders are informed? How is disagreement among investors reflected in prices and future returns?
Addressing the interaction between price informativeness and investor behavior presupposes, of course, that traders have asymmetric information, for without information asymmetry there is no role for learning from price. The workhorse model for studying asymmetric information in (competitive) financial markets is the noisy rational expectations (RE) model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , and similar ones due to Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) .
2 Unfortunately, the standard model is ill-suited for a full consideration of the questions posed above. It makes counterfactual assumptions about the distribution of asset payoffs and supply, and it leads to overly-simplistic descriptions of investor behavior.
In the standard model, all random variables are jointly normally distributed, and demand curves and asset prices are linear functions. Hence, all price observations are equally informative, and traders always react in the same way to changes in price. In practice, asset returns and supply are not jointly normally distributed. Fama (1965) and Mandelbrot (1963) were among the first to make note of this fact. Kon (1984) finds that discrete mixtures of normal distributions better describe stock returns than either normal, Student-t, or stable Paretian distributions. (Tucker (1992) reinforces this point with additional statistical tests, and Hall, Brorsen, and Irwin (1989) provide complementary evidence in the context of futures markets.) Recently, nonnormality has also received much coverage in the popular press in the context of heavy tails (see, for instance, Taleb (2007) ).
1 Fama (1991) is a standard reference on empirical tests of market efficiency. Brunnermeier (2001) discusses the theory.
2 There is a distinct but related literature, following Kyle (1985) , that studies the consequences of asymmetric information in markets in which some traders behave strategically. Other models in this vein include Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) , and Viswanathan (1993, 1996) , in which traders submit market orders, and Kyle (1989) and Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) , in which traders submit demand schedules. There is also a literature, initiated by Admati (1985) , that considers noisy RE models with multiple assets.
In this paper, I investigate the effects of asymmetric information in a class of noisy rational expectations models in which I relax the standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model to admit fundamentals and supply that do not follow a normal distribution. This seemingly minor change can have dramatic consequences for the standard results on the shape of demand curves (and consequently the possibility of information-based price crashes), price informativeness, the value of acquiring information, and the relation between disagreement and returns. The simplicity of the classic Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) economy makes it an ideal setting in which to illustrate the fragility of noisy RE models. My point is strengthened by the limited number of moving parts; more general models can be expected to provide even richer results as they afford more degrees of freedom for constructing examples.
My primary contribution is to characterize how the relation between price and fundamentals depends on the strength and direction in which investors react to information in price. I provide a purely information-based channel for many common phenomena. More specifically, I show how price-informativeness varies with the price level and how learning effects can cause uninformed investors to submit backward-bending demand curves, leading to price "jumps" and "crashes" in response to small changes in fundamentals.
3 Next, I
show that observation of (signed) trading volume may be valuable for uninformed investors because it provides a refinement of the information contained in price alone. Third, I show that the value of information can be non-monotonic in the number of informed investors in the economy. That is, information acquisition can be a strategic complement. Finally, I demonstrate that the relation between investor disagreement and returns depends on the relation between conditional expected returns and conditional volatility and on the skewness of fundamentals.
In standard noisy RE models price crashes are impossible in the absence of other frictions.
Demand curves of uninformed investors are downward-sloping at all prices, and because of linearity they always respond in the same way to perturbations in price. 4 As such, authors modeling crashes in settings with asymmetric information often introduce context-specific frictions. To rationalize the October 1987 crash, Gennotte and Leland (1990) introduce imperfectly anticipated hedging demand, which can cause large price reactions in response to 3 Strictly speaking, my model is static, so there are no changes to which traders can react. I follow the convention of many papers in this literature, e.g., Gennotte and Leland (1990) and Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) , and interpret comparative statics as approximating dynamic effects in a repeated version of the model. 4 In the multi-asset noisy RE model of Admati (1985) , demand curves can be globally upward sloping. However, as they are still linear they never bend backwards and generate crashes of the sort discussed here.
small changes in fundamentals. Similarly, Romer (1993) introduces higher-order uncertainty over the information quality of other traders. In his model, small changes in price can reveal this information quality and lead to discontinuous drops in price. Yuan (2005) considers the effects of borrowing constraints, which make low prices less informative: uninformed investors have difficulty disentangling whether low price is due to a low fundamental or a binding borrowing constraint that has prevented informed from trading fully on the basis of information. Similarly, Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) study a model with risk-neutral traders who are both short-sale and borrowing constrained. My model differs from all of the above in that I focus solely on the effect of asymmetric information with fully-rational unconstrained investors. It turns out that crashes arise naturally in settings with asymmetric information because, in general, price does not convey a fixed amount of information.
It is also difficult to reconcile the empirical evidence on the information content of trading volume and other market-generated statistics with standard rational expectations models.
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Typically, price is a sufficient statistic for all public information, and other market-generated statistics are redundant. Schneider (2009) gives a clear statement of this point, noting that "the fact that volume is helpful to an outside observer of the economy does not imply that investors within the economy can learn from observing volume. If investors are rational, then it is not clear how trading volume can contain information beyond the information that is already incorporated into prices." Schneider (2009) and Blume, Easley, and O'Hara (1994) introduce higher-order uncertainty and propose that volume can be informative about the quality of others' information. In my model, (signed) volume can be valuable, but the mechanism is different. Without normality, price may not be a sufficient statistic for public information and in such situations, signed volume refines the uninformed investors' information set.
Following the original Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paper, the standard intuition has been that as the number of informed investors in a market increases, it becomes easier to free-ride on their information by simply observing price. As such, the incentive for other traders to acquire information decreases-information acquisition is a strategic substitute.
There is a small recent literature investigating the opposite situation, strategic complementarity in information acquisition. Veronesi (2000, 2008) introduce correlated fundamentals and supply, which makes it more difficult for uninformed investors to disentangle whether price changes are due to fundamentals of supply. Ganguli and Yang (2009) 5 See, e.g., Karpoff (1987) , Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992) , and Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) for evidence on the relation between volume and returns.
and Manzano and Vives (2010) allow investors to also observe signals about the supply. Veldkamp (2006a,b) considers a dynamic Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model with economies of scale in the (competitive) information market. In such a setting, information in higher demand is supplied at a lower price, generating complementarities. My model generates complementarity through a pure information channel: when the number of informed investors increases, price may become more difficult to read, causing uninformed investors to submit demand curves that are less closely aligned with those of informed investors.
While the model allows for essentially general distributions of uncertainty for both the asset payoff and supply, one need not depart too far from normality to obtain the results above. Normal mixture distributions have been proposed as an empirically plausible alternative to normal distributions (Kon, 1984) , and as shown later, simple normal mixture specifications can produce a rich set of examples. In the standard model, the strong unimodality of the normal distribution implies that uninformed investors are able to learn from prices relatively "easily" (later, I make the unimodality condition precise and describe learning effects explicitly). High price is an unambiguous signal of high payoff (and vice versa), so that the informed and uninformed investors react in the same direction to a change in the fundamental and the equilibrium price function is monotone. When the number of informed investors increases, the information contained in price is "more correlated" with the fundamental, and uninformed investors are able to make portfolio decisions that are closer to those of the informed and therefore better aligned with the true state. Similarly, the fact that the conditional variance of a normal random variable, given another jointly normal random variable, is constant implies that there are no price levels at which an uninformed investor learns more or less than any other price level. With more general distributions this is not true without further restrictions on the distribution of uncertainty. I give examples of the above effects in Sections 4 below.
In order to derive the results above, I provide a tractable solution to a particular class of nonlinear noisy rational expectations models that nests the standard model. Instead of the usual solution method of conjecturing and verifying a (linear) price function, I approach the problem by solving a general version of the uninformed investors' optimization problem given an arbitrary price function and then utilize the market clearing condition to write down an equation that pins down the price as an implicit function of the primitive quantities in the model. In principle, the technique I use would also allow for uncertainty about quantities other than the conditional mean of asset payoffs, such as the variance, number of informed, or risk aversion.
Other notable exceptions to the normality assumption in the literature include Ausubel (1990a,b) , Peress (2004), and Vanden (2008) . However, these authors must make unappealing concessions and use a non-standard model setup or approximation methods. Bernardo and Judd (2000) develop a computational procedure for solving rational expectations models and demonstrate the non-robustness of some results from the standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model. An advantage of their approach is the large class of models that it handles, but without an explicit characterization of price, it is difficult to pin down the conditions on distributions or preferences that drive standard results. The economy of Veronesi (2000, 2003) is similar to that in this paper, except that their traders are risk-neutral and face a portfolio constraint, and they focus on a particular parametric distribution for random variables. Gibbons, Holden, and Powell (2010) consider a noisy RE model of an intermediate goods market in which all random variables are uniformly distributed and demonstrate nonrobustness of some of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) results in their setting. DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) study a class of economies that nests the non-noisy economy of Grossman (1976) ; they demonstrate uniqueness of Grossman's (1976) fully-revealing linear equilibrium and give robust examples of partially revealing equilibria when payoffs are non-normal.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the monotone likelihood ratio property and previews its role in many of the results in the paper. Section 4 lays out the general results described above, and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A collects results on sign-regular and single crossing functions that are used to prove some of my propositions. Proofs are relegated to Appendix B. Since my results speak to a number of different literatures, I postpone additional detailed discussion of related papers to the sections in which I present the relevant findings.
Model
The economy has three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. At the first date, t = 0, agents choose whether to become informed. At the second, t = 1, agents trade financial assets. At the final date, t = 2, assets make liquidating payouts. Figure 2 shows a timeline. There are two assets, a risky asset that has a payoff D and a risk-free asset that pays 1 and has price normalized to 1. The risky-asset payoff D is the sum of two components µ and ε. The distribution of the fundamental µ has density f µ , while ε is independently distributed N (0, σ 2 ε ). Note that because of the normal distribution for ε, the conditional distribution of D given µ is normal.
The assumption that ε has a normal distribution is not critical for my results, but it greatly simplifies the analysis. One way to motivate this assumption is to consider that even after the fundamental µ is known, there are a "large" number of "small" additive and independent idiosyncratic factors that can affect the final payoff. By the central limit theorem, the sum of these disturbances will be approximately normally distributed, and one can just as well aggregate them into a single term, namely ε. While this interpretation is plausible, I do not model it rigorously here.
To prevent fully-revealing prices, the risky asset is in random supply Z, which is independent of other random variables in the model and has density f Z . To simplify the proofs of various results, I assume that both µ and Z are supported on the entire real line and that their densities are continuously differentiable.
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A unit mass of ex-ante identical agents have CARA utility over wealth at t = 2 with common risk aversion α, so u(w) = −e −αw . Investors are endowed with x 0 shares of the risky asset and y 0 dollars in the risk-free asset that they can trade in the financial market.
Without loss of generality, I let x 0 = y 0 = 0 because a CARA investor's demand for risky assets is independent of initial wealth. Information about the risky asset payoff is available at a fixed dollar cost c > 0; before trading, investors choose whether to pay c to observe µ.
Those who choose to buy information ("informed investors") see µ immediately before the financial market opens. The remaining agents ("uninformed investors") do not see µ, but can use all public information -price and signed trading volume of the informed and noise traders -to make an inference about it. Note that all informed agents observe µ perfectly; they do not receive conditionally independent signals as in Hellwig (1980) or Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) .
All agents are price takers. All probability distributions and other parameters of the 6 It can be verified that all results are also true for absolutely continuous distributions with support other than the real line.
economy are common knowledge, and therefore, agents are only asymmetrically informed about the fundamental µ.
The set of normal mixture distributions is useful for constructing counterexamples without straying too far from the standard model. I illustrate most results in the paper for an economy in which µ and Z follow independent normal mixture distributions
Equilibrium
Let P λ denote the equilibrium risky-asset price when the fraction of informed agents is λ.
Let X I (µ, P λ ) denote the number of shares demanded by an informed agent as a function of fundamental µ and price. Since the informed types know the realized value of µ, their demand takes the standard mean-variance form X I (µ,
When the uninformed agents choose their demands, they have access to the price, as well as the signed volume (order flow) of the informed and noise traders.
7 Noise traders supply Z shares, so the signed trading volume of the informed and noise traders is λX I (µ,
However, it will turn out to be more convenient to work with the informationally-equivalent adjusted volume, defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Adjusted volume). The adjusted volume µ λ of the informed and noise traders is
The adjusted volume µ λ is a transformation of the signed volume of the informed and noise traders. and then subtract the price P λ . Their information set provides sufficient information to perform these calculations.
Let X U ( µ λ , P λ ) denote the demand of the uninformed as a function of the adjusted volume and price. The definition of equilibrium in the financial market is standard.
7 In the standard model signed volume provides redundant information; traders need only to observe price. In more general settings, signed volume may refine the information contained in price. In some results in this section I distinguish between the case in which investors condition only on price and the case in which they also observe signed volume.
8 A similar variable, labeled w λ , appears in the original Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paper. I choose the µ λ notation to emphasize that this variable will be interpreted as a signal about µ. Definition 2.2 (Financial market equilibrium). A rational expectations equilibrium in the financial market is a (measurable) price function P λ (µ, Z) mapping R 2 → R, and demand functions for the informed agents X I and uninformed agents X U such that all agents maximize expected utility, conditional on their information sets
and markets clear for each possible (µ, Z) pair
All statements in the paper about equality of random variables, such as the market clearing condition in Definition 2.2, should be understood to mean that the equality holds almost surely under the joint distribution of (µ, Z, ε), and all statements about equality of functions on R n should be understood to mean that the equality holds almost everywhere with respect to Lebesgue measure on R n . To avoid unnecessary technical clutter, I refrain from making this explicit in the results and exposition below.
If the random variables in the model were jointly normally distributed, I would now solve for the equilibrium by conjecturing a price function that is linear in the fundamental µ and supply Z, solving the uninformed investors' inference and portfolio problem given the price function, and then substituting the resulting demand into the market clearing condition.
This would produce a system of three equations with three unknowns (the coefficients in the price function). In this simple setting, the coefficient equations would have explicit closedform solutions. With a non-normal joint distribution, this solution technique is not possible since the functional form of the price is not clear a priori. Indeed, the best outcome one can hope for is to characterize the price as an implicit function of µ and Z.
The following result characterizes the equilibrium asset price, assuming that it exists.
(Proofs of all results are relegated to Appendix B.) The key step is to first solve a general version of the uninformed investors' optimization problem, assuming that they conjecture an arbitrary equilibrium price function. Since the amount demanded by the uninformed must be equal to the residual supply of the liquidity traders after subtracting the informed demand in equilibrium, the resulting condition determines an equilibrium risky-asset price that both clears the market and is consistent with the uninformed investors' beliefs.
Proposition 2.3. If there exists an equilibrium price function, P λ , then it is implicitly defined as
Looking at the relation in eq. (1), it is apparent that price depends on µ and Z only through the adjusted volume µ λ = µ − ασ 2 ε λ Z, which leads immediately to the following Corollary.
Corollary 2.4. If it exists, the equilibrium price P λ in Proposition 2.3 can be characterized as a function of the adjusted volume µ λ only,
From this point forward, I treat P λ as a univariate function mapping realizations m of adjusted volume µ λ into an equilibrium price, as in Corollary 2.4. There is no loss, however, in continuing to think of it as a function of the fundamental µ and supply Z that depends on them only through the linear combination µ λ .
To better understand the meaning of the integral in eq. (2), note that one can also write it as an integral over realizations of the payoff D = µ + ε rather than just the fundamental µ. Rearranging the resulting expression and writing out the utility function in general terms, u(·), gives
This looks like the standard representative agent pricing formula except that the "endowment" of the agent,
, is endogenous. Accordingly, one can interpret eq. (2) as a representative agent pricing formula in which the representative uninformed agent's equilibrium risky asset holding is the residual supply of the noise traders, net of the demand of the informed investors.
It is clear from eq. (2) that the price is a nonlinear function of the fundamental µ and supply Z. However, because the residual uncertainty ε is normally distributed and utility functions are exponential, the information conveyed by price is still a linear combination µ λ of the quantities µ and Z, as in the standard model. While this fact simplifies the analysis of the information content of prices, it is not vital for my results. Indeed, allowing for a more general distribution for ε would provide one more degree of freedom with which to construct counterexamples to standard results. Similarly, one could criticize the restriction to exponential utility, which precludes income effects. However, this also makes construction of counterexamples more difficult. Indeed, including nontrivial income effects would tend to strengthen most of the results in the paper. The restriction that µ has a moment generating function is needed so that expected utility exists (expected utility for a CARA investor is essentially a moment-generating function) and the integral in eq. (2) converges. As long as the integral is finite, then the existence of an equilibrium price that satisfies eq. (2) follows from the intermediate value theorem.
Unfortunately, the restriction on the distribution of fundamentals in the proposition rules out fat-tailed distributions, along with lognormal distributions.
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So far, I have said nothing of uniqueness. In principle, for some realizations of µ λ there could be multiple values of P λ that satisfy (2). Fortunately, that is not the case, and the equilibrium price correspondence is single-valued.
Proposition 2.6. The function defined by (2) is the unique µ λ -measureable price function.
If investors can condition only in price, then the function defined by (2) is the unique price function.
In some sense, the uniqueness result should not be surprising. In models in which agents do not learn from prices, multiplicity can arise if wealth effects are sufficiently strong to prevent aggregate demand from sloping downward at all points. Exponential utility rules out wealth effects, and as shown in Proposition 4.2, one can reduce the model to one in which the uninformed do not condition on price but instead observe only adjusted volume µ λ . Hence, the presence of only substitution effects means that for given µ λ , aggregate demand is downward sloping, and therefore the equilibrium price is unique.
A Corollary of Proposition 2.6 is that the linear equilibrium in the standard model is in fact the unique equilibrium (not merely the unique linear equilibrium).
Corollary 2.7. When µ and Z are independently normally distributed, the linear price function given in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is unique.
This completes the analysis of equilibrium in the financial market. Next, I address equilibrium in the information market.
Information market equilibrium
While it is not the focus of this paper, for completeness I now define equilibrium in the information market. Let CE(λ) denote the ex-ante certainty-equivalent gain CE (gross of cost c) from becoming informed as a function of the fraction λ of informed agents
Informed certainty-equivalent wealth
Uninformed certainty-equivalent wealth .
I use a standard definition of equilibrium in the information market, identical to that used by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . To add realism, one could more explicitly model an information production sector as in, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) or Veldkamp (2006b) . However, for simplicity and comparability with earlier work I choose the most basic possible setup.
Definition 2.8 (Information market equilibrium). An equilibrium in the information market is a fraction λ * ∈ [0, 1] such that,
• λ * = 0 and CE(0) ≤ c, or
• λ * ∈ (0, 1) and CE(λ * ) = c, or
Definition 2.8 says that an equilibrium in the information market falls into one of three possible cases. Either (1) no one buys information because the cost of doing so exceeds the benefit, even if no one else buys any, or (2) there is an interior value for λ * such that at the margin the gain from acquiring information is exactly equal to the cost of doing so, or (3) everyone buys information because it is sufficiently cheap that the benefit always outweighs the cost, regardless of how many others buy information.
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the information market is a more delicate matter than existence and uniqueness in the financial market. Since information market equilibria depend on the value of acquiring information, I postpone further discussion until I take up the value of information in Section 4.3.
In noisy REE models, investors must use available signals to make an inference about fundamentals. In my model, from the standpoint of the uninformed investors the signal is the adjusted volume µ λ , and the variable that they are trying to learn about is the fundamental µ. The results presented below on the value of technical analysis, the shape of uninformed investor demand, and the value of acquiring information depend on how uninformed investors react to the information contained in price. It turns out that a monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) for signals is the appropriate concept for characterizing reaction to information.
Discussion of the monotone likelihood ratio property
While the MLRP is familiar to most readers, in this section I will briefly restate the definition, discuss the implications for investor behavior, and tie the MLRP to a restriction on the distribution of noise in the economy. 10 Briefly, in my model the MLRP guarantees that uninformed investors' demand reacts in the "correct" direction to changes in adjusted volume µ λ , and it requires that the distribution of noise satisfy a particularly stringent unimodality condition. In more general terms, requiring the MLRP for endogenous signals in a noisy REE model guarantees that "good news" for one agent is also "good news" for other agents who learn about her information by looking at the price (or other market data), and it requires that signals be affiliated with fundamentals.
I begin by stating the definition of the monotone likelihood ratio property.
Definition 3.1 (Monotone likelihood ratio property). Consider any two random variables
X and Y. The family of conditional densities {f X|Y (·|y)} y∈Support(Y ) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) if for all x > x and y > y, the following inequality holds
If the inequality in eq. (4) is strict at every set of points, the family is said to satisfy the strict MLRP.
10 Milgrom (1981) is a standard reference for the MLRP.
It is helpful to think of the random variable X as a signal providing information about Y.
If the conditional densities of the signal X have the MLRP, then increases in X shift "up"
the posterior distribution of Y in the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) stochastic order (i.e., given x > x, the likelihood ratio of the posteriors
is increasing in y). The MLR ordering is a strengthening of the well-known first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD)
ordering.
11 In fact, Proposition 2 of Milgrom (1981) shows that a family of conditional densities {f X|Y } has the MLRP if and only if higher values of the signal X improve the posterior distribution of Y in the FOSD sense under any prior for Y. With only two random variables, the MLRP is equivalent to their being affiliated. See Milgrom and Weber (1982) for a detailed discussion of affiliation.
In my model, if the conditional densities of adjusted volume f µ λ |µ have the MLRP then higher values of adjusted volume µ λ imply MLR improvements in the risky asset payoff.
Recalling that µ λ can be written as a linear combination of the fundamental and supply,
Z, this implies that for a given realization of supply Z, both the informed and uninformed experience an MLR improvement in response to an increase in the fundamental µ; their beliefs react in the same direction to fundamentals. I provide more detail for this result below when discussing implications for investor demand.
Since adjusted volume µ λ is not one of the primitives of the model, it is helpful to have a condition on the underlying random variables that determines whether f µ λ |µ has the MLRP.
The following Lemma provides an equivalent condition on the distribution f Z of the asset supply.
Lemma 3.2. The conditional densities f µ λ |µ satisfy the (strict) MLRP if and only if log f Z is (strictly) concave.
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An alternative, but equivalent, characterization of Lemma 3.2 is that f µ λ |µ satisfies the MLRP if and only if the distribution of asset supply is strongly unimodal. 13 Requiring a logconcave distribution rules out fat-tailed noise distributions (Karlin, 1968, Proposition 7 .1.4) as well as both multimodal distributions and unimodal ones that are not strongly unimodal. Counterexamples to logconcavity (and thus the MLRP) need not be pathological.
The normal mixture examples used in this paper to break the MLRP can be thought of 11 Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) provide a proof, as well as an example that satisfies FOSD but not MLR. See also Chapter 1.C of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) for further discussion of the MLR order.
12 An (1998) and Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) discuss logconcavity and related properties. 13 A density on the real line is unimodal if for all K > 0, the set {x ∈ R|f (x) ≥ K} is convex. A density is strongly unimodal if its convolution with any other unimodal distribution is unimodal. If a distribution is strongly unimodal then it is unimodal, but the converse is not true.
as a world with higher-order uncertainty: noise trade is typically drawn from a normal distribution with, say, a mean of one, but with some small probability it is drawn from a distribution with a much higher mean, in which case noise traders flood with market with a large number of shares. Similarly, neither lognormal nor binomial distributions are logconcave. Even if one restricts attention to unimodal distributions with "nice" intuitive properties, logconcavity does not necessarily follow. Given a (bounded) distribution for the underlying state µ, Chambers and Healy (2009) Moving beyond probability assessments, it should be apparent that the way in which beliefs react to signals has implications for the way in which agents trade in response to signals. An upward shift in an asset's payoff distribution (for instance, an FOSD improvement) has both substitution and income effects in general (though income effects are absent with exponential utility). However, the signs and magnitudes of the effects vary, so the overall effect on demand is ambiguous without adding further restrictions on either utility functions or random variables.
14 To obtain clear comparative statics, one must restrict the class of upward shifts considered. As first noted by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) , MLR improvements are sufficient for all nonsatiated investors to demand a greater quantity of the risky asset in a single-risky-asset portfolio problem. Athey (2002, Lemma 5) proves the 14 It is a common misconception that FOSD improvements in a risky asset are sufficient for increased demand. As first pointed out by Fishburn and Porter (1976) , this is not true without further restrictions on the utility function. Note that despite the lack of wealth effects, FOSD is not sufficient even for exponential utility. Fishburn and Porter (1976) , Kira and Ziemba (1980) , Cheng, Magill, and Shafer (1987) , and Hadar and Seo (1990) provide conditions on utility functions that guarantee the "expected" comparative statics results for stochastic dominance shifts in various formulations of the portfolio problem. 
stronger result that MLR shifts are in fact necessary and sufficient for any nonsatiated investor to rebalance her portfolio in the expected direction regardless of the price of the risky asset. In other words, requiring the MLRP is equivalent not only to requiring that beliefs of both types respond in the same direction to changes in µ, but more importantly that their demands move in the same direction, regardless of the price that prevails in the market.
The intuition for why an MLR shift increases demand is straightforward. In short, it moves probability mass from bad (high marginal utility) states to good (low marginal utility)
states and does so in such a way that the worst states lose the most mass and the best states gain the most most mass. 15 Regardless of risk preferences, any agent will desire to hold more of an asset that undergoes such an improvement. The following heuristic proof may help clarify. Suppose that the conditional densities of adjusted volume, f µ λ |µ have the MLRP and consider a small increase in adjusted volume from m to m + ∆ m. The conditional density of the fundamental µ changes from f µ| µ λ (m| m) to f µ| µ λ (m| m + ∆ m). Using a first-order Taylor expansion, the new density can be written
Therefore, the new conditional density is the original one corresponding to the lower signal multiplied by a factor that scales it up or down depending on whether the local likelihood
is greater or less than zero. The MLRP implies that (m| m) is increasing in m, and it is straightforward to show that R (m| m)f µ| µ λ (m| m) dm = 0. Hence there exists some state m 0 below which the new density subtracts mass ( (m| m) < 0) and above which it adds mass ( (m| m) > 0); moreover, the further to the left of m 0 one moves, the more mass is removed and the further to the right one moves, the more mass is added.
The worst states (low µ) lose the most mass and the best states (high µ) gain the most mass.
This makes the asset unambiguously more attractive for any investor who prefers more to less, regardless of their risk preferences.
Consider again an economy in which signals have the MLRP. Up to now, I have said nothing of market clearing, but have merely described how agents react to signals, holding all else fixed. However, it should be unsurprising to learn that since the MLRP guarantees that the uninformed react in the "correct" direction to signals, it also guarantees that the market-clearing price reacts in the correct direction. To understand why this is, it may be helpful to first think about a model where there are no uninformed types. Consider an economy populated by only informed investors and noise traders. In this case, price always reacts in the expected direction. If the fundamental µ increases then, since changes in µ represent MLR shifts under the informed information set, the informed investors demand a greater quantity of risky asset at every price; therefore, in order to clear the market the equilibrium price must increase with µ, holding supply Z constant.
Conversely, an increase in supply Z means that the informed must accommodate a greater number of shares at any level of the fundamental µ, so price must decrease in Z for fixed µ.
Now consider the same thought experiment of making a small change to the fundamental µ or supply Z but introduce uninformed investors who try to infer µ. If µ increases, then the informed demand curve still shifts outward at every price. The uninformed, on the other hand, do not observe µ, only a noisy signal in the form of the adjusted volume µ λ .
4 General results
Uninformed demand and the information content of prices
In rational expectations models, price affects uninformed investor demand in multiple ways.
First, a change in price will cause uninformed investors to modify their demand due to a standard substitution effect. Secondly, since price conveys a signal about the fundamental, there is an information effect: if higher prices signal higher fundamentals, uninformed demand will increase with price. In the standard model, all prices are equally informative, and equilibrium demand curves for the uninformed slope down. In other words, the substitution effect of an increase in price dominates the information effect. However, this depends on the joint distribution of fundamentals and price. In general, conditional moments of fundamentals will vary nontrivially with the price level. For certain regions of price, the information effect may dominate, leading to backward-bending demand. In such regions price responds abruptly to small changes in the fundamental, which can be interpreted as a price crash or jump.
Other papers in the literature generate backward bending demand in asymmetric information models, but must introduce other features, such as hedgers who follow strategies that are nonlinear in price (Gennotte and Leland, 1990) , uncertainty over the number of informed traders (Romer, 1993) , or borrowing constraints for informed types (Yuan, 2005 (Yuan, , 2006 . Here, the effect arises for purely informational reasons. In this sense it is complementary to the model proposed by Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) . They consider a single-asset noisy RE model with risk-neutral traders who are subject to a constraint on position size (otherwise price would always be fully-revealing) and in which the fundamental follows a two-point distribution. While my model differs slightly from theirs, Proposition 4.1 below suggests the reason that they are able to generate crashes: any two-point distribution is not logconcave, and therefore uninformed demand can appear to "overreact" to information about the fundamental.
To illustrate a price crash in my model, consider the normal mixture setting described above in which the mixing parameter for the supply distribution satisfies η = 1 so that only the fundamental µ is non-normal. The example above is an illustration of the following result.
Proposition 4.1 (Backward-bending demand). Assume that the distribution of adjusted volume given the fundamental f µ λ |µ has the MLRP and that the price function is differentiable.
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• If there exists m < m such that for µ λ ∈ [ m, m ] the price function satisfies
then uninformed demand slopes up for prices in the interval [P λ ( m), P λ ( m )].
• If log f µ is concave, then
≤ 1 and uninformed demand is everywhere downwardsloping.
Recalling that the adjusted volume can be written µ λ = µ − Unlike other models in the literature, in my setting crashes and jumps arise without adding nonlinear hedgers, portfolio constraints, or additional uncertainty. All that is required is that in some regions, the uninformed learn at a particularly fast rate as price changes.
This suggests that crashes may arise naturally for purely informational reasons, as long as there is asymmetric information in the economy.
The value of signed volume
In the standard model the asset price provides all possible information that the uninformed can glean from public sources, and observing (signed) volume, aggregate order flow, or any public quantity other than the current price provides no additional information. 18 Blume, Brown and Jennings (1989) and Grundy and McNichols (1989) , both of which study three-date dynamic models in which past prices are informative when used in conjunction with the current price.
While these other studies require introduction of either uncertainty about some quantity other than fundamentals or additional rounds of trade, the following proposition shows that a similar result can hold even when investors need only to learn about the asset payoff, and there is no uncertainty over information quality or diversity. (i) If the conditional distribution of adjusted volume given the fundamental, f µ λ |µ , has the MLRP, then the price function is strictly increasing in adjusted volume µ λ and observing P λ provides the same information to the uninformed as observing µ λ .
a fully-revealing equilibrium exists. See Blume, Easley, and O'Hara (1994) for a heuristic proof.
(ii) If f µ λ |µ does not have the strict MLRP, then observing µ λ provides more information than P λ in the following sense: depending on the distribution of the fundamental, µ, there may exist realizations m = m of µ λ for which P λ ( m ) = P λ ( m).
The first result in Proposition 4.2 is equivalent to the fact that with the MLRP, the price function is strictly increasing in adjusted volume µ λ . In that case, each realization of P λ is associated with a unique value of µ λ , and price provides exactly the same information as direct observation of adjusted volume µ λ . An increase in fundamental µ MLR-improves the investment opportunity set for both types which increases the aggregate demand and therefore increases the price. Informed and uninformed demand may shift in opposite directions in response to increases in the fundamental µ, and over certain regions the uninformed reaction may be sufficiently strong to decrease the price. In those situations, the price is no longer a sufficient statistic for learning about µ, and the adjusted volume allows the uninformed to distinguish between the various regions of the price function. This is illustrated in Figure 5 (b) in which the price function is non-monotone, and there are some realizations of price that correspond to three possible values of µ λ .
Nonmonotonic price functions also arise in asymmetric information models with feedback effects due to endogenous firm investment decisions (Dow and Rahi, 2003) or regulatory intervention (Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott, 2010) . For instance, in Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010), a given price may correspond to both a low-fundamental, positiveintervention state as well as a high-fundamental, no-intervention state. In my model, cash flows are exogenous, but there is a similar explanation with respect to the fundamental and noisy supply. Recall that in the normal mixture setting, one can think of the noisy supply realization as coming from a two-step procedure: first choose the 'high' or 'low' supply dis-tribution, and then draw the supply from that distribution. In such a situation, the same price can arise in three distinct states. As the adjusted volume moves from 'high' values to 'low' values, the uninformed become become relatively confident that the low realization can be attributed to a draw from the 'high mean' supply distribution. Hence, they are willing to accommodate more of the asset than if they believed that the low realization was due to a low value for the fundamental µ. Hence, depending on the distribution of supply, a relatively low realization of µ λ may actually be good news. Rather, what is required is to change the distribution of uncertainty in the economy in such a way that the price function is no longer invertible. Whether one achieves this by, say, making signal quality random or simply changing the underlying probability distributions is immaterial. What is key is that the change makes the price function nonmonotonic in the fundamental.
The value of information
In the standard model as the number of informed investors increases, price becomes more informative, and the uninformed are better able to free-ride on the informed types' information. It follows that the value of observing the fundamental µ decreases with the number of informed. In other words, information acquisition is a strategic substitute: as more investors learn about µ, the incentive for others to do the same decreases. It has been an open question whether the opposite case (strategic complementarity in information acquisition) is also possible in an otherwise-standard noisy RE model.
In these models, an increase in the number of informed investors has two competing effects. It typically drives the asset price closer to the fundamental in each state (price effect), but it also changes the equilibrium allocations (share effect). The price effect tends to reduce the total surplus that both types enjoy at the expense of the noise traders, and it reduces the share of that surplus taken by the informed investors. On the other hand, the share effect requires that in equilibrium the remaining uninformed hold less advantageous positions in the asset in order to accommodate the increased number of informed investors.
In the standard model with normal distributions, the price effect is sufficiently strong to offset the share effect. Price is responsive to information, which causes the price effect to dominate the share effect and make information acquisition a strategic substitute.
In my model, I can characterize the price and share effects of a change in the fraction of informed, λ, directly.
Lemma 4.3 (Utility gain).
Assume that the price function is differentiable with respect to m and λ. The derivative of the utility gain function CE with respect to the number of informed λ can be written as the sum of a price effect and a share effect
where e I and e U are functions defined in the proof in Appendix B.
As alluded to above, the interpretation of Proposition 4.3 is that a change in the number of informed agents affects the equilibrium in two ways. First, price changes in each state of the world both because the relative number of both types changes, and because the remaining uninformed hold different information relative to the previous world in which there were fewer informed investors. This is represented by the price effect term in eq. (5). Second, holding the price constant, the remaining uninformed investors must accommodate a larger number of informed types in each state of the world. This is represented by the share effect term in eq. (5) The first effect affects both the informed and uninformed. On the other hand, the second effect only affects the uninformed, since the informed investors' demand depends on µ λ only indirectly through the price.
The next proposition gives sufficient conditions for signing the share effect.
Proposition 4.4 (Sign of the share effect).
• If
≤ 1 then the share effect is positive.
A price that moves less than dollar-for-dollar with fundamentals makes the share effect positive. Increasing λ, the fraction of informed investors, increases the correlation between µ and µ λ , making µ λ "higher when µ is high" and "lower when µ is low" (compared to before the increase in λ). The equilibrium risky asset holding of the informed and noise traders is given by
≤ 1, this expression will be increasing in µ λ and hence the holdings of the informed and noise traders will also tend to be higher when µ is high and lower when µ is low. As the uninformed investors must hold the opposite position, it follows that an increase in λ causes the uninformed investors' equilibrium allocation of the risky asset to be relatively smaller when µ is high and relatively higher when µ is low in order to accommodate the greater number of informed investors. As their positions move in the opposite direction of the fundamental, this increases the ex-ante benefit of becoming informed.
I have been unable to sign the price effect in general, but numerical experimentation suggests that the MLRP and downward-sloping demand is sufficient to guarantee that it is negative and that it dominates the share effect. To understand why, it is helpful to refer back to the discussion in Section 3. As explained there, with the MLRP, the uninformed investors' demand reacts in the same direction as the informed to changes in the fundamental
µ. An increase in the number of informed λ makes the signal µ λ more highly correlated with the fundamental µ, and therefore makes uninformed demand more highly correlated with informed demand. This drives the price closer to the fundamental (on average), reducing the profit that the informed investors make from their information.
More precisely, it is straightforward to show that under the MLRP assumption, increases in the fraction informed, λ, improve the accuracy (sometimes also called effectiveness) of the signal µ λ . Accuracy was introduced by Lehmann (1988) in the context of statistical decision theory as a generalization of Blackwell (1951 Blackwell ( , 1953 sufficiency, which is another common criteria for comparing signals. Persico (1996 Persico ( , 2000 introduced the use of accuracy in economic contexts. Blackwell sufficiency was the definition of informativeness used by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . Unfortunately, many signals cannot be compared using Blackwell sufficiency.
Accuracy allows the comparison of many more signals, as discussed by Lehmann (1988) . It also nests Blackwell sufficiency; if one signal is sufficient for another, then it is also more accurate.
The overall sign of the utility gain expression depends on the sign and strength of the two effects discussed above. As noted above, I have been unable to determine general conditions under which it is either increasing or decreasing. I present here some simple numerical examples to illustrate situations in which, contrary to the standard result, information acquisition is a strategic complement.
Example 1 (Failure of the MLRP is not necessary for complementarity). There is a small recent literature investigating situations in which information acquisition is a strategic complement. The model closest to my own is that of Barlevy and Veronesi (2000) . They study a noisy RE model with risk-neutral investors in which the fundamental follows a two point distribution, and supply an exponential distribution. They claim that the change in distributions leads to complementarity in their model, but as pointed out by Chamley (2008) they compute the value of information in a non-standard way. After correcting this, information acquisition remains a strategic substitute. Barlevy and Veronesi (2008) resurrect their previous model by appealing to positively correlated fundamentals and supply. Effectively, it appears that introducing correlation generates complementarity by breaking the MLRP. Barlevy and Veronesi (2008) exhibit an economy in which increases 21 A two-point distribution for supply is not consistent with the standing assumption that all random variables are continuously distributed, but a similar result holds if one approximates the binomial distribution with a continuous, 'U'-shaped, distribution centered at zero and having peaks at −1 and 1.
in price induce downward MLR shifts in the asset payoff. They note that if one allows the fundamental and supply to be correlated in the standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model, strategic complementarity arises if the signal from price (i.e., the adjusted volume µ λ ) is negatively correlated with the fundamental. If the second effect is sufficiently strong, information acquisition can be a strategic complement. Veldkamp (2006b) introduces an information production sector into an overlapping generations version of the standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model. The endogenous price of information generates complementarity in information acquisition and can lead to 22 Note that this is consistent with the positive correlation between the fundamental µ and supply Z. Since Z enters µ λ with a negative sign, it induces a negative correlation between µ and µ λ as long as the correlation with µ is sufficiently positive.
'frenzies' in the information market in which many investors seek to buy the same information. The information market is such that it costs the provider nothing to distribute the information once it has been discovered, so to maximize profits, she reduces the price of information as demand increases to deter entry by competitors. Such price reduction can feed back and further increase demand for information. In recent work, García and Strobl (2010) show that relative wealth concerns can generate complementarities in information acquisition.
Despite these advances, to my knowledge, no one has yet demonstrated strategic complementarity in a standard static noisy REE model. Here, I have shown that even a simple model can generate the effect for purely informational reasons.
Implications for information market equilibria
Here I take up briefly the question of equilibrium in the information market, which was deferred from Section 2.1.1
In the examples presented in Figure 6 above, one can determine the equilibrium value of λ for various values of c by drawing a horizontal 'cost' line at level c. Interior equilibria are points at which the cost line intersects the certainty equivalent gain, while corner equilibria λ = 0 or 1 occur when CE(0) < c or CE(1) > c, respectively. In both examples in Figure   6 , there are multiple equilibria in the information market. First, there is a zero-information equilibria in which no one finds it profitable to purchase information. Secondly, there are two interior equilibria 23 in which a strictly positive number of agents gather information.
This example is an illustration of the following Corollary to Proposition 4.4.
Corollary 4.5.
• If information acquisition is a strategic substitute for all λ ∈ (0, 1), then the equilibrium in the information market is unique.
• If information acquisition is a strategic complement for λ ∈ (0, k) for some constant k ∈ (0, 1), then there may exist multiple equilibria in the information market: for certain values of c, there exist both an equilibrium in which no investors buy information and interior equilibria in which a strictly positive number of investors buy information.
Since complementarity can generate multiple equilibria, my model, as those of Veldkamp (2006b) or Chamley (2007) , provides a potential explanation for time-varying price informa-23 Only the interior equilibria at which CE is downward-sloping is stable in the tântonnement sense. 
The relation between disagreement and returns
A number of empirical papers document a negative relation between investor disagreement and future returns (see, e.g., Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002; Goetzmann and Massa, 2005) . 24 The "difference of opinions" (abbreviated DO) model of Miller (1977) in which investors "agree to disagree" and do not condition on prices implies that if investors are short-sale constrained then stocks about which there is more disagreement will tend to have higher valuations (and hence lower returns). The reason is that the most pessimistic investors are prevented from taking negative positions. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) build on the Miller (1977) insight and provide further empirical support. Accordingly, based on these models, the documented negative relation between disagreement and returns is often taken as evidence that investors do not fully condition on prices Banerjee (2010) points out the difficulty of distinguishing RE and DO models in a static setting with no short-sale constraints. Static RE and DO models can be made observationally equivalent by appropriate parameter choices. To distinguish the hypotheses, Banerjee (2010) considers how disagreement relates to the dynamic properties of returns and trading volume in a setting in which investors care about future resale prices. His empirical results support the hypothesis that investors do in fact condition on prices on average.
In my model, with only two classes of investors, disagreement can be defined as the cross-sectional variance of beliefs about D at t = 1 and is given by
As the next proposition shows, if return distributions are sufficiently negatively skewed or the relation between conditional volatility and excess returns is sufficiently weak, nonnormality enhances the difficulty of distinguishing RE and DO in a static setting.
Proposition 4.6. The unconditional covariance between investor disagreement and future returns is given by
Proposition 4.6 shows that the relation between disagreement and returns is given by the sum of two terms. The first is the covariance between conditional volatility and expected returns, which intuition typically suggests should be positive. 25 Holding the fraction of informed λ constant, greater disagreement is associated with greater uncertainty about fundamentals, which leads to a higher risk premium. The second term is the expected conditional skewness of the excess return µ − P λ . 26 This reflects the fact that for, say, a positively skewed distribution, the realizations of µ associated with the greatest degree of disagreement tend to be those that are above the mean.
The following Corollary emerges immediately from Proposition 4.6 and implies that the existing empirical evidence of a negative unconditional relation between disagreement and returns is not necessarily inconsistent with a fully-rational noisy RE model.
Corollary 4.7. If the covariance between excess returns and conditional volatility,
is sufficiently negative, then the covariance between excess returns and disagreement is negative.
Empirically, there is evidence that the conditional skewness of the market is negative. French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) document "asymmetric volatility"-the fact that volatility tends to be higher when returns are negative. More recently, Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2001) estimate conditional skewness directly and find that it is negative for the market as a whole (but is often positive for individual stocks). Furthermore, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) find that stocks for which measures of disagreement, such as lagged turnover, are highest tend to have more negatively skewed returns.
Even if one believes that conditional skewness is positive, given the conflicting evidence on the sign of the relation between conditional volatility and returns found by French, Schwert, 25 Empirically, however, Whitelaw (1994) shows that the relation is not as consistent as it is in most theoretical models.
26 For notational convenience, I refer to the third central moment of a random variable as its skewness. The typical definition divides the third moment by the cube of the standard deviation. The nature of the Proposition is unchanged if one uses the standard definition.
and Stambaugh (1987), Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) , and Whitelaw (1994) , it is not clear that a negative relation between disagreement and returns indicates a failure of investors to condition on price. Corollary 4.7 implies that such a result can be consistent with efficient use of the information in price, and demonstrates a heretofore unconsidered link between higher moments and the return-disagreement relation.
Conclusion
This paper studies a standard noisy rational expectations model in the spirit of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) but relaxes the usual assumption of joint normality of fundamentals and supply. Results suggest that the normality assumption is not innocuous.
I show that, in general, price-informativeness varies with the price level and learning effects can cause uninformed investors to submit backward-bending demand curves, leading to price jumps and crashes in response to small changes in fundamentals. If signals do not satisfy a monotone likelihood ratio property, observation of signed trading volume may be valuable for uninformed investors because it provides a refinement of the information contained in price alone. Furthermore, the intuition that increasing the number of informed traders makes it easier for uninformed investors to free-ride on their information is not always true. The value of obtaining information can be non-monotonic in the number of informed investors in the economy. Finally, the relation between disagreement and returns depends on the relation between conditional expected returns and volatility and on the skewness of fundamentals.
While the model presented is not the most general possible, the intuition should carry over to more complex models in which investors observe diverse information, have utility functions that are not exponential, or face an opportunity set with multiple risky assets.
The key insight is that many important comparative statics results depend on whether investors' beliefs and demands move in the same direction and with the comparable strength in response to changes in fundamentals. Restricting the conditional distribution of signals by requiring the MLRP and logconcavity guarantees that they do. Without such restrictions, the signs of many important comparative statics are ambiguous. As such, I provide the first demonstration of the importance of the MLRP for the noisy RE literature.
Overall, my results emphasize that most existing noisy RE models tend to be very special cases that are easy to analyze, but whose conclusions are not robust to perturbations of the economy. For the most part, the ubiquity of the standard model is due to the fact that it is technically demanding to analyze equilibrium when price must both clear the market and convey information (but not be fully-revealing). The assumptions of exponential utility and joint normality ease the technical burden significantly and lead to tractable, elegant models. However, a number of resulting properties that we often take to be "properties of well-functioning financial markets" may be more appropriately considered to be "properties of the normal distribution."
A Some results on single-crossing and sign-regular functions I collect in this Appendix some general results on single-crossing and sign-regular functions that are used to prove various results in the paper. I begin with the relevant definitions. For my purposes, a single-crossing function is defined as follows.
Definition A.1 (Single-crossing). A function f : R → R is single-crossing from below if there exists some point x 0 such that x ≥ x 0 implies f (x) ≥ 0. A function f is single-crossing from above if −f is single-crossing from below.
The following two definitions are taken directly from Definitions 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1 of Karlin (1968) .
Definition A.2 (Sign regularity). A function K : R 2 → R is sign regular of order 2 (SR 2 ) if there exist constants κ 1 , κ 2 ∈ {−1, 1} such that κ 1 K(x, y) ≥ 0 and for for any choice of x 1 < x 2 and y 1 < y 2
where |·| represents the determinant. The function is strictly sign regular of order 2 (SSR 2 ) if the inequalities are strict.
The more commonly-encountered property of total positivity is a special case of sign-regularity Definition A.3 (Total positivity). A function K : R 2 → R is totally positive of order 2 (T P 2 ) if it is SR 2 and κ 1 = κ 2 = 1. The function is strictly totally positive of order 2 (ST P 2 ) if it is SSR 2 and κ 1 = κ 2 = 1.
To clarify the importance of sign regularity, recall that a conditional density f X|Y (x|y) has the (strict) MLRP if and only if it is (S)T P 2 . Similarly, a utility function u has (strictly) decreasing absolute risk aversion if and only if u (x − y) is (S)T P 2 . Jewitt (1987 Jewitt ( , 1991 ) discusses these and other economic applications of sign regularity.
In the following Lemma, I generalize Theorem 11.2 from Chapter 6 Karlin (1968) to functions that are SR 2 . I also provide a "strong" version of the result for ST P 2 and SSR 2 functions.
Lemma A.4. Let f and K be functions mapping X × Y → R for some intervals X, Y ⊂ R, and let µ be any σ-finite measure on Y. Assume that the integral g(x) := Y f (x, y)K(x, y)dµ(y) exists and is continuous in x.
If for each fixed y ∈ Y, f (x, y) is increasing in x, and either (a) For each fixed x ∈ X, f (x, y) crosses zero at most once, and from below, as y increases, and K is T P 2 ; or (b) For each fixed x ∈ X, f (x, y) crosses zero at most once, and from above, as y increases, and K is SR 2 with κ 1 = 1, κ 2 = −1; then g crosses zero at most once, and from below, as x increases. (Note that the single-crossing "point" could in fact be an interval over which g = 0.) If the hypotheses are strengthened to require that f is strictly increasing in x for fixed y and either (a) K is ST P 2 , or (b) K is SSR 2 , then if g crosses zero it does so at a single point.
Proof of Lemma A.4. I prove Case (b). First, consider the "weak" version of Case (b) in which K is SR 2 and f is weakly increasing in x. The proof is similar to that of the weak version of Case (a) in Karlin (1968) . Take x 0 such that g(x 0 ) = 0. It suffices to show that for any x > x 0 , one has g(x) ≥ 0. By the hypothesis that f is single-crossing in y for fixed x, it follows that there exists y 0 (which will, in general, depend on x 0 ) such that f (x 0 , y) 0 as y y 0 . Now, write
Since f is increasing in x, the term f (x, y) − f (x 0 , y) in the first integral is ≥ 0, and since κ 1 = 1, one has
K(x,y0) ≥ 0. Thus, the first integral is ≥ 0. In the second integral, f (x 0 , y) 0 as y y 0 by the choice of y 0 , and
0 as y y 0 by the assumption that κ 2 = −1. It follows that the second integral is also ≥ 0. Hence,
K(x,y0) , and therefore g(x), is ≥ 0. This completes the "weak" version of Case (b). The "strong" version follows immediately since in that case, the weak inequalities involving f and K that were used to sign the two integrals on the last displayed line are strict.
Corollary A.5. If the hypotheses of Lemma A.4 are strengthened to require Y K(x, y)dµ(y) = 1 for all x ∈ X, then the function g is increasing in the "weak" version of the Lemma and strictly increasing in the "strong" version.
Proof. Fix any k ∈ R and apply Lemma A.4 with f (x, y) replaced by f (x, y) := f (x, y) − k. It follows that g(x) − k crosses zero at most once and from below. Since k is arbitrary, g must be increasing.
For convenience, I restate, without proof, Lemma 1 from Persico (2000) .
Lemma A.6 (Lemma 1 from Persico (2000) ). Let Y ⊂ R be any interval. Let g : R → R be an increasing function, and let h : R → R cross zero at most once and from below. Assume that for some measure µ on Y, we have
B Proofs
I begin with a preliminary Lemma that will be used in the proofs of Proposition 2.3 and 2.6. Lemma B.1. If the uninformed investors can condition only in price, then any equilibrium price function must be one-to-one in z for each fixed realization µ = m and one-to-one in m for each fixed realization Z = z.
27
27 Of course, one can only make such statements up to a sets of Lebesgue measure zero. As in the body of the paper, I do not insist on such qualifications in this Appendix. It is straightforward but tedious to extend all proofs to be fully rigorous with respect to such measure-theoretic details.
Proof of Lemma B.1. I prove that price must be one-to-one in z for fixed m. The proof of the second result is essentially identical. Assume to the contrary that P λ is an equilibrium price function but that there exists some m such that P λ (m, ·) is not one-to-one in its second argument. Then there exist some z = z with P λ (m, z) = P λ (m, z ). This implies
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. For clarity, I break the proof into steps. I begin by solving the agents' optimization problems assuming that the uninformed can condition only on the price, and that they have conjectured some price function satisfying the conditions in Lemma B.1 that they use for updating their beliefs. Next, I impose market clearing and simplify the resulting expression to produce the an implicit function that characterizes a candidate price function. I show that as long as the candidate function does in fact satisfy the conditions in Lemma B.1 then observing price is equivalent to observing adjusted volume and the proof is complete. To conclude, I argue that when the candidate function does not satisfy the conditions in Lemma B.1, it nevertheless remains an equilibrium price function as long as the uninformed can condition directly on adjusted volume. Fix a realization of (µ, Z) = (m, z). Consider the informed agent's maximization problem.
Since this problem is that of a CARA investor facing a conditionally normal risky asset, the demand function is standard
Next, consider an uninformed agent's maximization problem. Assume that the uninformed conjecture some price function P λ : R 2 → R when computing their posterior beliefs given the observed price p, and this function satisfies the condition in Lemma B.1
Since ε is independent of the other random variables, I can integrate it out, rewriting the maximization as
Differentiation yields the first-order condition for uninformed demand X U (p). 28 Since the utility function is strictly concave, the first-order condition defines the global maximum.
After dividing out terms that are constant with respect to µ, I can rewrite (7) explicitly as an integral, being careful to account for the possibility that the conditional distribution of µ may not have a density function
28 Differentiation through the expectation is justified since the expected utility is a conditional moment generating function of D evaluated at the point −αx, and moment generating functions are infinitely continuously differentiable in their domain of existence.
My next goal is to derive an expression for the joint distribution of µ and P λ in terms of the distributions of the primitive random variables in order to characterize the conditional distribution in eq. (8). The condition that P λ be one-to-one for each fixed µ = w guarantees that there exists a inverse function P −1 λ (p; w) that maps price to a unique value of supply for each fixed w. The inverse is defined implicitly by p = P λ (w, P −1 λ (p; w)). For clarity of exposition, assume that the first partial derivative of the price function with respect to z exists and is continuous almost everywhere. (Below, I argue that the proof still goes through without this assumption.) Then using Bayes rule and the standard transformation of random variables formula, the conditional distribution has a density which can be written as
The above steps characterize the uninformed investors' information set and optimal demand for a given function P λ . Now I will impose market clearing and use eq. (8) to pin down the equilibrium price. The market clearing condition requires that at an equilibrium price P λ (m, z), the quantity demanded by the uninformed investors equals the negative of the quantity demanded by the informed investors and noise traders:
Hence, I can replace p with the candidate equilibrium price function P λ (m, z) in eq. (8) and use the market clearing condition to substitute for X U (P λ ) to obtain a functional equation in
It remains to derive a more explicit expression for the conditional distribution evaluated at the equilibrium price. Consider once again the negative of the quantity demanded by the informed investors and noise traders: z − λX I (m, P λ ). If some other state (y, v) leads to the same price p as the state (m, z), then the uninformed demand must be the same in both states since they condition only on price. By market clearing, this implies that the effective supply must also be equal in both states. Hence, when evaluated at an equilibrium price P λ (m, z), the inverse function in eq. (9) must produce
It follows that the conditional density in eq. (9) can be written as
To eliminate the remaining Jacobian terms, differentiate eq. (11) totally with respect to z to obtain
which can be rearranged to yield
. This expression is is constant with respect to y, so the Jacobian terms cancel from the numerator and denominator of eq. (12) to yield
Substituting this conditional density into eq. (10), canceling terms that do not depend on y, and rearranging produces the eq. (1) in the text. To simplify the exposition in the above proof, I assumed that the uninformed investors' conjectured P λ was continuously differentiable in z almost everywhere. Without this assumption, the conditional distribution of µ given P λ when evaluated at an arbitrary point p may no longer possess the density in eq. (9). However, because Lemma B.1 guarantees a one-to-one equilibrium price function, the inversion of the equilibrium price in (11) is still possible (and by market clearing must produce the same result). It follows that when evaluated at the equilibrium price P λ (m, z), the conditional beliefs must still be given by the function of (m, z) presented in eq. (13). Hence, eq. (1) characterizes all possible price functions. This completes the analysis of the case in which the uninformed can condition only on the price.
As indicated in Corollary 2.4, any P λ characterized by eq. (1) depends on (µ, Z) only through the adjusted volume µ λ . Therefore, even though I derived it under the assumption of conditioning only on price, it remains an equilibrium if the uninformed can also condition on adjusted volume. m , which is constant with respect to y and strictly positive, and thus does not affect the value of p at which eq. (2) equals zero
If this integral exists and is continuous in p in some nonempty open set, then by the intermediate value theorem, it suffices to show that there exist p and p in that open set such that F (p) < 0 and F (p ) > 0. Given the assumption on existence of the conditional moment-generating function, the integral is finite as long as p satisfies
. Furthermore, since moment generating functions are infinitely continuously differentiable in their domain of existence, it follows that F is continuously differentiable in p.
29 It remains to find the p and p with Evaluating F at m gives 1−λ λ δ, where 0 < δ < δ 0 . I will show that one can choose δ such that F (p(δ)) < 0. We have
Now, split the integral on the last line into positive and negative parts
29 To see this, let M µ| µ λ denote the conditional moment generating function and write F as
If the first integral in line (14) can be made arbitrarily negative by appropriate choice of δ, it will dominate the second (positive) integral, and the proof will be complete. It is convenient, and equivalent, to show that the negative of the first integral, 
The derivatives of the price function P λ with respect to the realization of µ λ = m and the parameter λ are Substituting this for the numerator in the last term above gives the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Under the assumption that f µ λ |µ has the MLRP, Proposition 4.2 below implies that the price function is invertible. This implies that uninformed demand is in fact a function of P λ .
Given that P λ is increasing in µ λ , is follows also that uninformed demand will be increasing in price if and only if it is increasing in m. Assuming that the price and uninformed demand functions are differentiable, differentiating the equilibrium demand X U ( m, P λ ( m)) totally with respect to m gives
Substitute in from Lemma B.2 for all three partial derivatives on the right-hand side of the equation. It is then tedious but straightforward to manipulate the resulting expression and show that it is ≥ 0 if and only if
To prove the second statement, it suffices to show that logconcavity of f µ implies that ∂P λ ∂ m ≤ 1. The nondifferentiable case can be handled by rearranging the uninformed first-order condition and applying Corollary 2.3 of Ma (1999) .
Consider the expression for the derivative of the price function in eq. (19) By a simple application of Bayes rule on the conditional density in the integrand, one can express the numerator in the first term in eq. (19) 
If log f µ is concave, then
fµ(y) is decreasing in y. The numerator of the second term in eq. (22) is therefore ≤ 0 by Lemma A.6, and as noted in the first section of this proof, the denominator is ≥ 0. Hence, the entire term is ≤ 0, and therefore is increasing in y, Lemma A.6 implies that the numerator of the first term in eq. (19) is greater than zero. Similarly, since y is increasing, the numerator of the second term and the denominator of each term are also greater than zero. It follows that eq. (19) is greater than zero.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Fix λ ∈ (0, 1), and choose any τ ∈ (λ, 1). Following Persico (1996 Persico ( , 2000 , define the function T λ,τ,m ( m) = m + λ τ ( m − m). Persico (1996) shows that conditional on µ = m the random variable µ τ is equal in distribution to T λ,τ,m ( µ λ ). Hence, when fraction τ are informed, the difference in certainty equivalent wealth is CE(τ ) = − 1 α log are the negative of the unconditional expected utilities of each type of investor. I now proceed to differentiate the integrand. To conserve space, I use the notation e I and e U for the exponentials in the informed and uninformed expected utility, divided by EI and EU, respectively. = − The informed investors' first-order condition implies that m − P τ (T ( m)) − αX I (m, P τ (T ( m)))σ 2 ε = 0, which eliminates the second term in the first integral. Similarly, the uninformeds' first-order condition implies that the terms in the second integral involving 
